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Investment Noise and Trends
ROBERT F. STAMBAUGH*
Abstract
During the past few decades, the fraction of the equity market owned directly by individuals
declined significantly. The same period witnessed investment trends that include the growth of
indexing as well as shifts by active managers toward lower fees and more index-like investing. I
develop an equilibrium model linking these investment trends to the decline in individual own-
ership, interpreting the latter as a reduction in noise trading. Active management corrects most
noise-trader induced mispricing, and the fraction left uncorrected shrinks as noise traders’ stake in
the market declines. Less mispricing then dictates a smaller footprint for active management.
*Presidential address to the American Finance Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Jan-
uary 2014. Stambaugh is with the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. The author
is grateful to Martijn Cremers, Rick Green, Ron Kaniel, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Antti Petajisto,
Nick Roussanov, Luke Taylor, and Yu Yuan for helpful comments or assistance. Special thanks go
to Lˇubosˇ Pa´stor for valuable comments and discussions.
NOISE TRADING HAS BEEN a familiar concept in finance since the 1980s. In the following
decades, noise traders have increasingly populated the finance literature, but their real-life presence
in the stock market may have declined. Why? First, noise trading is more often associated with
individuals than institutions. Fischer Black describes noise traders as “people who trade . . . even
though from an objective point of view they would be better off not trading.”1 The behavioral
finance literature points to numerous factors that lead individuals to make unproductive invest-
ment decisions. Second, there has been a substantial downward trend in the fraction of U.S. equity
owned directly by individuals. As displayed in Figure 1, since 1980 that fraction has fallen by more
than half, from 48% to around 20% based on estimates by French (2008), who also suggests the
pool of investors most likely to make mistakes may have thus shrunk.2 This decline in individual
ownership continues a trend that began essentially at the end of World War II, when households
held more than 90% of U.S. corporate equity. Explanatory factors likely include government tax
and retirement policies (Rydqvist, Spizman, and Strebulaev, 2014).
The past few decades also witnessed changes within the investment management industry. Pas-
sive investing—“indexing”—became popular as an alternative to active investment management,
while active managers, particularly mutual funds, lowered their fees and in aggregate became more
index-like in their investing. Active management’s loss of market share is evident in Panel A of
Figure 2, which plots the fraction of equity mutual fund assets actively managed (thicker line) and
the fraction of institutionally owned equity that is actively managed (thinner line). Nearly all eq-
uity mutual fund assets were actively managed in 1980, but the fraction dropped to 83% by 2012.
Over the shorter period for which data are available, the actively managed fraction of institution-
ally owned equity fell from 81% in 1986 to 59% in 2006.3 Panel B plots the average percentage
fees paid by investors in active mutual funds (thicker line) and the average fee paid by institutional
investors for active management. While the fee paid by institutional investors stayed rather flat
around 0.4%, the fees paid by mutual fund investors fell substantially, from 2.3% in 1980 to 1.0%
in 2012, due largely to reductions in (ammortized) load charges.
Activemanagement lost market share to indexing while also becomingmore similar to indexing
as an investment. For example, Panel C of Figure 1 displays the history since 1980 of the index
tracking error for the aggregate portfolio of actively managed equity mutual funds in the dataset
constructed by Pa´stor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2013). The value plotted for a given year is the
annualized standard deviation of the market-adjustedmonthly return for the subsequent 60 months.
A significant downward trend is evident, with the tracking error falling from 2.2% in 1980 to 1.2%
in 2006. The trend in active management’s becoming less active appears not only in its tracking
error but also in its stock holdings. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) define “active share,” which
summarizes the deviations between an active manager’s relative stock weightings and market-
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index weightings. Panel D of Figure 2 plots active share for the aggregate portfolio of active
mutual funds from 1980 through 2011.4 A significant downward trend is again evident, with active
share falling from 38% in 1980 to 23% in 2011.
I ask whether the above trends in investment management are consistent with the downward
trend in individual equity ownership and an associated decline in noise trading. The basic hypoth-
esis is that less noise trading implies a lower capacity for profitable active management. I explore
the validity of this hypothesis by developing an equilibrium model for active management in a
market with noise traders. The model is simple in many respects but captures the simultaneity be-
tween the amount of mispricing and the amount of active management. I then calibrate the model
and find it supports the consistency between the investment trends noted above and a decline in
noise trading.
The model implies that active management corrects most of the noise-trader inducedmispricing
that would otherwise exist. A fraction of the mispricing remains uncorrected, because active man-
agers are impeded by both trading costs and idiosyncratic risk. The remaining mispricing allows
active management to earn positive alpha at the expense of noise traders. The fraction of mispric-
ing uncorrected by active management shrinks as the fraction of the equity market owned by noise
traders declines. With less mispricing, active management must then have a smaller footprint.
I. Active Management with Noise Traders
The model has four types of agents: active managers, investors, noise traders, and intermedi-
aries. In a market with many assets, active managers identify and exploit opportunities to outper-
form the market benchmark and, in particular, maximize their information ratios. Each manager
acts competitively, conditioning on prices as well as his fund’s size, while facing convex costs of
intermediation when deviating from benchmark asset weightings. Competitive investors allocate
their stock-market wealth across the active funds and a passive market-index fund so as to maxi-
mize the Sharpe ratio of the resulting combination. Noise traders buy individual stocks directly and
do not invest in either active funds or index funds. Intermediaries receive trading costs incurred
by active managers but otherwise play no role in the model. The aggregate stock-market wealth of
the noise traders equals the fraction h times the total value of the stock market; the investors have
aggregate stock-market wealth equal to the fraction 1− h of total stock market value.
The model presented joins a literature on delegated portfolio management that is too extensive
to survey here. Two studies that are perhaps most closely related, in that they analyze equilib-
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rium prices in an economy with noise traders and delegated management, are Garcia and Vanden
(2009) and Petajisto (2009). Garcia and Vanden assume a single risky asset, imperfect competition
among managers, and endogenous information acquisition. Petajisto has a given active manager
maximize the information ratio while the manager assumes his resulting portfolio characteristics
determine investors’ overall allocation to active management. In addition to possessing these dif-
ferences from the current model, neither study includes convex costs associated with establishing
active (non-benchmark) positions.
A. Stocks
The market contains N stocks, and the total supply of each stock equals one share. The model
considers a single investment period. Stock i has share price pi at the beginning of the investment
period and value xi at the end of the period (including dividends). A share in the market portfolio
has end-of-period value xm = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 xi and price pm = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 pi. I assume that
xi = x¯i + ηi, (1)
with E(ηi) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N . I further assume that the ηi’s have a risk structure given by
ηi = piz + pmi, i = 1, . . . , N, (2)
where E(z) = E(i) = 0, Cov(i, j) = 0 for all i 6= j, and
Var(i) =
(
pi
pm
)
σ2, i = 1, . . . , N. (3)
I assume that (1/N)
∑N
i=1 i ≈ 0, so that the rate of return on the market portfolio is well approxi-
mated as
rm = µm + z − 1, (4)
where µm = x¯m/pm , with x¯m = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 x¯i. The rate of return on stock i is given by
ri =
xi
pi
− 1 =
(
x¯i
pi
)
+ z +
(
pm
pi
)
i − 1, (5)
from which we see that βi = Cov(ri, rm)/Var(rm) = 1. The market-adjusted return on stock i is
Ri = ri − βirm =
(
x¯i
pi
)
− µm +
(
pm
pi
)
i. (6)
The alpha for stock i is therefore equal to
αi = E(Ri) =
(
x¯i
pi
)
− µm
= µm
(
p¯i − pi
pi
)
, (7)
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where
p¯i = x¯i/µm (8)
is the expected end-of-period value discounted by the expected market return—the stock’s CAPM
fair value given that βi = 1. The variance of stock i’s market-adjusted return is
Var(Ri) =
(
pm
pi
)
σ2. (9)
From equations (2), (3), and (9) note that a stock with a relatively higher price has both higher
variance of next-period value and lower variance of return. This assumption allows active man-
agers’ relative allocations across stocks to depend simply on deviations between prices and fair
values (a result presented in the next subsection). Given this specification of variances and the
resulting active allocations, the model is most sensibly applied in a setting where prices are nor-
malized to comparable magnitudes in the cross section (e.g., scaled by a fundamental such as book
value).
B. Active Managers
There are M active managers. At the beginning of the period, manager j sets a proportional
fee rate equal to f (j). Investors then decide to invest in aggregate the dollar amountW (j) with that
manager, whose fee revenue is thus f (j)W (j). Given W (j), manager j chooses allocations across
individual stocks to maximize his information ratio, defined as net alpha divided by the standard
deviation of market-adjusted return.
Each manager can replicate the market index at zero cost but pays trading costs in order to devi-
ate from those benchmark allocations. These costs represent compensation to liquidity-providing
intermediaries for taking short-lived positions to facilitate the ultimate market clearing between
managers and noise traders.5 Specifically, define the active weight
φ
(j)
i = φ
(j)
A,i − φm,i, (10)
where φ
(j)
A,i is manager j’s weight in stock i, and φm,i is stock i’s weight in the market portfolio.
(Note
∑N
i=1 φ
(j)
A,i =
∑N
i=1 φm,i = 1.) The value of stock i represented by the manager’s benchmark
deviation isD
(j)
i = |φ(j)i |W (j), and the associated trading cost is denoted as C(j)i . I assume that the
proportional trading cost is given by
C
(j)
i
D
(j)
i
= cδ
(j)
i , (11)
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where δ
(j)
i is the fraction of stock i’s total market value represented by D
(j)
i , and c is a constant.
In other words, the proportional trading cost is linear in the amount traded. A linear function for
the proportional trading cost in a given stock is entertained, for example, by Kyle and Obizhaeva
(2013). That study examines portfolio transition trades and concludes that a linear function fits the
data only slightly less well than a nonlinear square-root specification. Those authors also model
differences in c across stocks, whereas I suppress such cross-sectional variation for simplicity.
With the cost specification in equation (11), we will see below that the manager faces decreasing
returns to scale with respect to the size of his assets under management. The model of Berk and
Green (2004) features decreasing returns to scale, and a number of studies have investigated the
presence of fund-level decreasing returns to scale using mutual fund data. Pa´stor, Stambaugh, and
Taylor (2013) report evidence consistent with fund-level decreasing returns, though not with strong
statistical significance when employing methods that avoid econometric biases.6 Edelen, Evans,
and Kadlec (2007) conclude that trading costs present an important source of scale diseconomies
for mutual funds.
The M managers possess identical information, which consists of the pi’s, the x¯i’s, σ, and c.
Each of theM managers takes those quantities and W (j) as given. I assume M is finite but large
enough to make the price-taking assumption plausible. Each manager chooses allocations across
individual stocks to maximize his information ratio, and the following proposition characterizes
the results of that maximization.
Proposition 1. Manager j’s active weight in stock i is
φ
(j)
i = a
(j)
(
p¯i − pi
pm
)
, (12)
where
a(j) = µm
(
f (j)pm
cW (j)ψ
)1/2
(13)
and
ψ = (1/pm)
N∑
i=1
α2i pi. (14)
Trading costs incurred equal fee revenue:
N∑
i=1
C
(j)
i = f
(j)W (j). (15)
Manager j’s resulting portfolio has net alpha equal to
α
(j)
A =
(
f (j)ψpm
cW (j)
)1/2
− 2f (j), (16)
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market-adjusted volatility equal to
σ
(j)
A = σ
(
f (j)pm
cW (j)
)1/2
, (17)
and information ratio equal to
I
(j)
A =
α
(j)
A
σ
(j)
A
=
1
σ
[
ψ1/2 − 2
(
cf (j)W (j)/pm
)1/2]
. (18)
Proof: See Appendix.
We see from equation (12) that the active allocation to asset i is simply a cross-sectional con-
stant, a(j), multiplied by the deviation of the price from the stock’s CAPM fair-value. The man-
ager’s resulting alpha and information ratio are both decreasing in assets under management,W (j),
confirming the presence of decreasing returns to scale as discussed earlier. The presence of the
square root ofW (j) in the denominator of a(j) in equation (13) implies that as a given price-taking
manager receives more money to manage, he increases φ
(j)
i W
(j)—the dollar size of his active po-
sition in stock i—but each additional dollar is deployed less actively than the previous one. Note
from equations (16) and (18) that a manager’s net alpha and information ratio are increasing in ψ,
defined in equation (14). As will be discussed later,ψ summarizes the overall amount of mispricing
present in the cross-section of stocks.
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (16) is the gross alpha, before fees and trading
costs, since equation (15) implies that trading costs lower return by the same amount as the fee
rate, f (j). The latter result—that the fraction of the manager’s assets spent on trading is equal to
the fee rate—occurs because convex trading costs counterbalance a manager’s incentive to scale
up active positions to lessen the importance of the fee. To see this, let φ denote the vector of
the manager’s active weights, let α denote the vector of the N assets’ alphas, and let Σ denote
the variance-covariance matrix of the assets’ market-adjusted returns. Note that the elements of
φ sum to zero. With no trading costs and a fee rate of f , the manager’s information ratio is
I = (φ′α− f)/√φ′Σφ. For any active weights such that φ′α > 0, the manager’s incentive is then
to multiply those weights by an arbitrarily large scalar, so that I simply approaches the zero-fee
information ratio, φ′α/
√
φ′Σφ. With convex trading costs such as the specification in equation
(11), scaling up the weights becomes increasingly costly. The scaling of φ is then helpful only to
the point where the fee rate is exactly counterbalanced by trading costs as a fraction of assets under
management, i.e. where fee revenue equals total trading costs. This implication is consistent with
the empirical evidence of Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec (2013), who conclude that mutual funds’
annual trading costs as a fraction of net asset value are comparable in magnitude to the funds’
expense ratios.
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C. Investors and Managers in Equilibrium
Investors allocate their stock-market investments across the active managers and a market in-
dex fund so as to maximize the Sharpe ratio of the resulting combination. Investors do not concern
themselves with the individual stock x¯i’s, which can be treated as known only by the active man-
agers. Investors simply assess active managers’ overall portfolio α
(j)
A ’s and σ
(j)
A ’s. In the main
formulation of the model, I assume investors make those assessments correctly. An alternative
scenario in which investors err is discussed later.
Each investor chooses an allocation across active managers that produces the maximum in-
formation ratio of the resulting active portfolio. That active portfolio is then combined with the
market index fund to achieve the highest overall Sharpe ratio. I assume the number of investors is
large relative to the number of funds (i.e., thousands of funds, millions of investors), and wealth
is sufficiently disperse across investors such that each investor takes each manager’s α
(j)
A and σ
(j)
A
as given when making allocation decisions. In other words, investors treat their own individual
allocations as having no effect on theW (j)’s in equations (16) through (18).
A key feature of the resulting competitive equilibrium is that each manager receives the same
fee revenue, f (j)W (j). To see why, first note that the active (market-adjusted) returns for all man-
agers are perfectly correlated with each other, as equation (12) shows that managers’ vectors of
active weights are spanned by a common vector. Second, each manager’s information ratio, I
(j)
A ,
is a decreasing function of f (j)W (j), as revealed by equation (18). Now observe, applying basic
portfolio theory, that if two managers with perfectly correlated active returns have different I
(j)
A ’s,
the manager with the higher I
(j)
A will dominate the other and attract any money flowing to either of
the two. As the manager with the higher I
(j)
A attracts money, however, that manager’s I
(j)
A drops.
In equilibrium, money must flow to each manager such that the I
(j)
A ’s are the same across man-
agers, and this condition implies, from equation (18), that f (j)W (j) is the same across managers.
Managers thus face unit elasticity with respect to their fee rate; those charging a higher rate receive
proportionately less money to manage, such that the fee rate is irrelevant to the fee revenue.7 If g
denotes the common level of fee revenue, f (j)W (j), received by each manager, then the weight of
fund j in the aggregate portfolio of active managers is
ω(j) =
W (j)∑M
j=1W
(j)
=
g/f (j)∑M
j=1 g/f
(j)
=
f¯
Mf (j)
, (19)
where f¯ is the harmonic mean of fee rates,
f¯ =

 1
M
M∑
j=1
1
f (j)


−1
. (20)
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The alpha and market-adjusted return volatility of the aggregate active portfolio are given by
αA =
M∑
j=1
ω(j)α
(j)
A (21)
σA =
M∑
j=1
ω(j)σ
(j)
A , (22)
noting that equation (22) follows from the previously discussed perfect correlation among the
managers’ active returns.
Let y denote the fraction of investors’ aggregate stock-market wealth that is allocated to ac-
tive management. Because investors share the same objective—maximimum Sharpe ratio—each
investor can achieve that maximum by allocating the fraction y to the aggregate portfolio of active
management. In doing so, each investor takes αA and σA as given in the competitive equilibrium.
Therefore, as shown by Treynor and Black (1973), the optimal y from an individual investor’s
perspective is given by
y = γ
αA
σ2A
, (23)
where
γ =
(
E(rm)− rf
Var(rm)
)
−1
. (24)
The value of y that delivers equation (23) in equilibrium, for a given mean fee rate f¯ , is character-
ized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The active allocation y is given by
y =
1
f¯
ψN(1− h)(c/M)
(
γ
σ2 + 2γN(1− h)(c/M)
)2
. (25)
Proof: See Appendix.
Given that each of theM funds receives fee revenue g = f (j)W (j), the aggregate fee revenue
is
Mg =

 M∑
j=1
f¯
f (j)

 g = f¯

 M∑
j=1
g
f (j)

 = f¯

 M∑
j=1
W (j)

 = (f¯ y)(1− h)Wm, (26)
where Wm is the aggregate value of all stocks. Observe from equation (25) that the previously
discussed fee irrelevance for individual managers also occurs in aggregate with respect to the
mean fee, f¯ . A higher f¯ simply produces a proportionately lower aggregate allocation to active
management, leaving the product f¯y—and thus aggregate fee revenue—unchanged. This result
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affords a simple explanation for the number of active managers. If the cost to be a manager is
equal to κ, then entry of managers occurs to the point where fee revenue covers that cost, and thus
M = (1/κ)(f¯ y)(1− h)Wm.
The following proposition gives the aggregate active portfolio’s alpha, market-adjusted volatil-
ity, information ratio, and active weight in stock i. The latter three quantities are expressed con-
ditional on the aggregate allocation, y, as well as in alternative forms that rely on the previous
proposition.
Proposition 3. The aggregate portfolio of the active managers has net alpha equal to
αA =
f¯σ2
γN(1− h)(c/M) , (27)
market-adjusted volatility equal to
σA =
(
σ2f¯
Ny(1− h)(c/M)
)1/2
=
f¯ σ
ψ1/2
(
2 +
σ2
γN(1− h)(c/M)
)
, (28)
and information ratio, αA/σA, equal to
IA =
1
γ
(
σ2f¯y
N(1− h)(c/M)
)1/2
=
σψ1/2
σ2 + 2γN(1− h)(c/M) . (29)
The portfolio’s active weight in stock i is given by
φi =
(
f¯µ2m
yN(1− h)(c/M)ψ
)1/2(
p¯i − pi
pm
)
=
(
σAµm
σψ1/2
)(
p¯i − pi
pm
)
. (30)
Proof: See Appendix.
Both αA and σA are proportional to the average fee, f¯ , which drops out of the information ratio,
IA, in the second equality in (29). Note that IA is increasing in the mispricing measure ψ.
The positive net alpha in equation (27) comes at the expense of the noise traders, whose aggre-
gate portfolio must earn negative gross alpha. This statement follows directly from the identity that
the aggregate portfolio of non-indexed investments must earn zero gross alpha, as noted for exam-
ple by Sharpe (1991) and Fama and French (2010). Those studies also point out that an implication
of that identity is a negative net alpha for active management in aggregate, given positive costs of
active management. It is important to realize, however, that such a statement involves defining
active management as all non-indexed investment. In the model here, that definition would have
“active” management encompass the investors’ allocation to active managers as well as the hold-
ings of the noise traders.
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D. Equilibrium Pricing
The degree of mispricing, summarized by ψ defined in equation (14), depends on stock prices.
We see above that ψ enters the allocation to the aggregate active portfolio, which in turn enters that
portfolio’s market-adjusted volatility, information ratio, and stock weights. Fully understanding
those equilibrium quantities requires understanding the model’s implications for prices. Accom-
plishing the latter relies on the market-clearing condition,
hφH,i + (1− h)φS,i = φm,i, i = 1, . . . , N, (31)
where φm,i is stock i’s market weight, φH,i is the stock’s weight in the aggregate stock portfolio
of the noise traders, and φS,i is the stock’s weight in the aggregate investor portfolio. The investor
weight φS,i comprises the allocations to active and passive management: φS,i = yφA,i+(1−y)φm,i.
The noise-trader weight φH,i is treated as exogenous and potentially creates mispricing that active
management exploits. I assume φH,i ≥ 0 (no short selling by the noise traders). The role of φH,i
in a stock’s equilibrium price is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium price of stock i is
pi = p¯i + θ(pˆi − p¯i), (32)
where
pˆi = NpmφH,i (33)
is the price for stock i that would prevail in the absence of active management (i.e., when y = 0),
and
θ =
[
1 +
(1− h)
h
(
γµm
σ2/N + 2γ(1− h)(c/M)
)]
−1
. (34)
Proof: See Appendix.
To understand why pˆi is the price when there is no active management, suppose the investors were
to allocate all of their stock-market wealth to passive management, so that φS,i = φm,i. Substituting
φm,i for φS,i in equation (31) and noting φm,i = pi/(Npm) gives pi = NpmφH,i, which is equal
to pˆi in equation (33). Note that pˆi does not depend on the fraction of noise traders, h. That is,
even a small presence of noise traders could cause large pricing errors when there is no active
management.
The price-correction coefficient, θ, is increasing in h, meaning that a larger fraction of noise
traders in the stock market results in less correction of the mispricing they create.8 Note also that
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θ is increasing in the trading-cost parameter, c, implying that lower liquidity results in less price
correction. This implication is consistent with evidence that stock prices are more efficient when
liquidity is higher, as presented in empirical studies by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008,
2011) and Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2013). The value of θ is also increasing in σ, so that
higher idiosyncratic volatility results in less price correction. Evidence that higher idiosyncratic
volatility is associated with greater mispricing is presented, for example, by Stambaugh, Yu, and
Yuan (2013).
The value of θ is likely to be small as long as the noise-trader fraction, h, is not close to
1. In the examples calibrated in the next section, θ is less than 0.001. The main reason θ is
small is that both the number of managers, M , and the number of stocks, N , are fairly large
relative to the respective quantities they divide in the denominator of the second term inside the
brackets in equation (34). Note that if both M → ∞ and N → ∞ as other quantities are held
constant, then θ → 0. As N → ∞ the non-market volatility of stocks can be diversified away,
presenting potential asymptotic arbitrage in the manner of Ross (1976). Trading costs impede such
arbitrage, but asM →∞, or equivalently as κ→ 0, those trading costs become vanishingly small.
(Recall that κ is the cost to be an active manager.) The reason is that proportional trading costs
decrease with the amount traded, as in equation (11), and the trading amount of each individual
manager’s benchmark deviation becomes infinitesimal as the number of managers grows. As the
opportunities available to each manager approach costless asymptotic arbitrage, the fraction of
uncorrected mispricing must vanish, and θ → 0. While this comparative static result correctly
states the effect of increasingM as c is held constant, I argue later when calibrating the model that
it is more reasonable to view the ratio (c/M) as remaining stable whenM trends upward.
A small value of θ implies that active management eliminates virtually all of whatever mispric-
ing the noise traders might produce. Active management thereby provides a substantial externality
to society if noise traders would otherwise produce significant mispricing. The mispricing that
remains nevertheless supports the active management industry. How large is that industry? Recall
that active management’s allocation in equation (25) depends on fee rates. For a sufficiently low f¯ ,
active management can always receive a large allocation, as long as aggregate fee revenue supports
the existence of at least one manager. How much fee revenue gets collected is another question.
We see from equation (25) that the fee revenue depends on the amount of equilibrium mispricing,
summarized by the value of ψ defined in equation (14).
11
The mispricing measure ψ depends on the pi’s and the αi’s. Substituting from equations (7)
and (32) into equation (14) gives
ψ = θ2µ2m
N∑
i=1
[(pˆi − p¯i)/pm]2
p¯i/pm + θ[(pˆi − p¯i)/pm] . (35)
The average of (pˆi − p¯i)/pm across the N assets equals 0, since summing the p¯i’s in equation (8)
gives Npm, noting
∑N
i=1 x¯i = Npmµm, and summing the pˆi’s in equation (33) also gives Npm,
noting
∑N
i=1 φH,i = 1. The value of ψ depends on the magnitudes of (pˆi − p¯i)/pm across assets.
Specifying the cross-sectional distribution of those deviations is explored in Section II.
Mispricing in this model refers to the deviation of a stock’s price from its CAPM fair-value, p¯i,
and that fair-value defined in equation (8) depends on µm, which is (one plus) the expected return
on the overall market. Whether or not µm also reflects fair pricing of the aggregate expected end-
of-period value, x¯m, is outside the model’s scope. Noise traders might also exert systematic effects
that impact the market’s expected return as well as its volatility (e.g., Delong, Shleifer, Summers,
Waldman, 1990, and Shiller, 2000). I take the market’s expected return and volatility as exogenous
to the model, and in the calibration presented later I simply specify those quantities as constant
over time.
E. Investor Error
The model assumes that investors have rational expectations and correctly assess αA and σA,
which are the characteristics of the aggregate active portfolio relevant to the allocation decision.
The expression for y in equation (25) gives the equilibrium allocation to active management under
those correct assessments. Suppose investors err in their assessments. A more extensive model
would have investors recognize that possibility and optimize accordingly. I simply consider what
happens in the current setting when investors unwittingly allocate suboptimally.
Deviating from the optimal active allocation affects equilibrium prices. The price-correction
coefficient, θ in equation (34), takes a different value—denote it θ∗—and thus the mispricing mea-
sure ψ in equation (35) takes a different value—denote it ψ∗. Suppose the active allocation y∗ is λ
times the allocation that is optimal when the mispricing measure under that allocation equals ψ∗.
The following proposition characterizes the resulting prices and the aggregate active portfolio.
Proposition 5. Denote the aggregate allocation to the optimal portfolio of active managers as y∗.
When y∗ equals λ times the allocation that is optimal under the equilibrium prices that result under
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y∗, the value of θ in equation (32) is replaced by
θ∗ =
[
1 + λ1/2
(1− h)
h
(
γµm
σ2/N + 2γ(1− h)(c/M)
)]
−1
. (36)
The aggregate portfolio of the active managers has net alpha equal to
α∗A = λ
−1/2
[
αA − 2f¯
(
λ1/2 − 1
)]
, (37)
market-adjusted volatility equal to
σ∗A =
(
ψ
λψ∗
)1/2
σA, (38)
and information ratio equal to
I∗A =
α∗A
σ∗A
=
(
ψ∗
ψ
)1/2 [
IA − 2(λ
1/2 − 1)f¯
σA
]
, (39)
where αA, σA, and IA are given in equations (27) through (29), and ψ
∗ is given by equation (35)
with θ replaced by θ∗. Proof: See Appendix.
Consider, for example, an over-allocation to active managment, so that λ > 1. One effect is
greater price correction as compared to the case when λ = 1, since θ∗ is decreasing in λ. The
alpha on the active portfolio is also less than when the active allocation is optimal, since α∗A is
also decreasing in λ. The decrease in alpha comes from two sources, which can be understood
by examining the alpha for a given manager in equation (16). One source is the greater price
correction, resulting in a lower value of ψ. The other source is the effect of decreasing returns
to scale, so that a greater allocation to active management raises each manager’s W (j), holding
fees constant. Both sources work together to produce an inverse relation between alphas and the
allocation to active management. Over-allocation can make the net alpha negative, in which case
the fees (paid to managers) and trading costs (paid to intermediaries) are then more than can be
made up by the positive gross alpha, despite managers’ optimizing with what they are given to
manage. The gross alpha is always positive for investors, negative for noise traders, and zero for
the weighted combination.
An inverse relation between alphas and the amount of money allocated to the active manage-
ment industry—industry-level decreasing returns to scale—is proposed and analyzed by Pa´stor and
Stambaugh (2012). Pa´stor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2013) find empirical evidence in support of
industry-level decreasing returns for actively managed equity mutual funds.
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II. Modeling Noise Trader Investment
Within the model, noise traders invest directly in individual stocks rather than through either
active or passive managers. In aggregate they own fraction h of the equity market. My empirical
proxy for h is the fraction of U.S. equity owned directly by individuals, as displayed in Figure 1.
The other relevant property of noise traders is the extent to which their aggregate allocations
to individual stocks deviate from those justified by fair values. If across stocks the magnitudes of
pˆi − p¯i are sufficiently large, a nontrivial amount of those deviations can remain uncorrected even
though the fraction uncorrected (θ) is small. The weight φH,i in the aggregate portfolio of the noise
traders determines the pˆi’s as in equation (33). I view the empirical counterpart for φH,i as stock
i’s aggregate weight in the direct stock holdings of individuals.
Portfolios of stock held directly by individuals are notoriously undiversified, as observed four
decades ago in studies by Blume, Crockett, and Friend (1974), Lease, Lewellen, and Schlarbaum
(1974), and Blume and Friend (1975). Further evidence is provided in more recent studies. For
example, Polkovnichenko (2005) finds that among households with liquid financial assets in excess
of $1 million (in 1989 dollars), the households that hold stocks directly typically hold 15 stocks or
less. In the remaining income cohorts, the same study finds households that directly own stocks
typically hold three stocks or less.9 Polkovnichenko also finds that the same households whose
direct holdings are undiversified often nevertheless hold a substantial fraction of their financial
wealth in diversified mutual funds.
While the typical individual’s direct stock holdings are undiversified, the more relevant issue
for pricing is the extent to which the low diversification survives aggregation. If the degree to
which a given stock is under-weighted or over-weighted is independent across individuals, then
those deviations average out when aggregating across many individuals and have little if any effect
on prices. In contrast, if there is commonality in direct stock holdings across individuals, the low
diversification of investors’ portfolios does not completely wash out in aggregate and can therefore
impact prices (Shleifer and Summers, 1990).
Evidence of significant commonality in individuals’ stock holdings is reported by Feng and
Seasholes (2004), Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2008), and Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009).
The Barber et al. study also concludes that various shared behavioral biases play important roles in
producing the commonality. Barber and Odean (2008) find that investors generally favor “attention-
grabbing” stocks that have appeared in news stories or have experienced extreme returns or trading
volume. Consistent with that evidence, Fang and Peress (2009) find that stocks with high media
coverage earn low returns, especially stocks with relatively high individual ownership (i.e., stocks
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with low ownership by 13F filers). In general, the empirical evidence suggests individual investors
respond to various events and stimuli in similar ways, due to behavioral biases or constraints on
their ability to obtain and process information not readily available.10
The evidence for commonality across individual investors is significant but does not fully pin
down the degree to which low diversification at the individual level survives aggregation. I adopt a
specification that admits a wide range for that outcome. The first step is to observe that the relative
pricing error (pˆi − p¯i)/pm appearing in the mispricing measure ψ in equation (35) can be written
as
(pˆi − p¯i)/pm = NφH,i − x¯i/x¯m, (40)
using equations (8) and (33) along with the relation pm = x¯m/µm. I assume that the price and
payoff of each stock i is normalized by expected end-of-period value so that x¯i = x¯m, and thus
(pˆi − p¯i)/pm = NφH,i − 1. (41)
In other words, with this normalization, mispricing depends simply on the extent to which aggre-
gate noise-trader allocations deviate from equal weights.
Next define vi = NφH,i. I approximate the cross-sectional distribution of the vi’s with a
continuous Weibull density for v. The density is defined for v ≥ 0, consistent with the assumption
that noise-traders do not short. The Weibull distribution has two parameters, determining the
distribution’s scale and shape.11 In this application, E(v) = 1, given that
∑N
i=1 φH,i = 1, so there
is one free parameter k that determines the distribution’s shape. The resulting family of densities
is illustrated in Figure 3. As k becomes large, the density concentrates around v = 1, yielding
the completely diversified portfolio that puts equal weights on all stocks. As k becomes small,
the mass concentrates toward zero and skewness increases, yielding an undiversified portfolio that
puts low weights on most stocks and large weights on a relative few. The mispricing measure ψ in
equation (35) can be written as
ψ = θ2µ2m
N∑
i=1
(vi − 1)2
1 + θ(vi − 1) , (42)
using equation (41) and the definition vi = NφH,i. The analog in terms of the continuous v is
ψ = θ2µ2mN E
{
(v − 1)2
1 + θ(v − 1)
}
. (43)
I take equation (43) as a reasonable proxy for equation (42) for large N , which is nearly 7,000 in
the calibration below.
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III. Trends and the Model
A. Data Trends
The model defines h as the fraction of equity owned by noise traders, and in the data I take
h to be the fraction of equity owned by individuals. My objective is to focus on trends rather
than fluctuations.12 In order to isolate the trend in individual ownership, I specify the values for
h as the points on a linear trend fit through the actual series of individual holdings, displayed as
the dotted line in Figure 1. The quantity σA in the model is the active portfolio’s market-adjusted
return volatility, and in the data I take σA to be the tracking error of the aggregate portfolio of
active mutual funds. As with h, I take the values of σA to be points on a linear trend through the
series of mutual-fund tracking errors discussed earlier, and Panel C of Figure 4 displays that result.
Similarly, I fit a trend line through active share, as displayed in Panel D of Figure 4.
I also want to isolate trends from year-to-year fluctuations when constructing the empirical
analogs for the fee rate, f¯ , and the active allocation, y. From the model’s perspective, an incon-
venient feature of the real world is that investors served by professional money management are
essentially split into two segments: retail (mutual fund) investors and institutional investors such
as pension funds. The current model does not admit such segmentation. Extending the model to
do so could be a worthwhile, but for this study I make a simplifying compromise with the data.
Specifically, for the active allocation, I first fit separate trend lines through the mutual fund series
and the institutional series and then take the average of those two trend lines as the input for y in
the model. I do the same thing for fee rates to construct the input for f¯ . The resulting trend lines
are displayed in Panels A and B of Figure 4.
The objective of averaging the trends across the retail and institutional segments is to have the
data discipline the single resulting trend in a manner that, while rudimentary, is representative of
changes in investment management within each segment. An alternative would be to ignore the
segmentation and simply combine the two segments into one pool, weighting by the respective
sizes of each segment. This approach seems less desirable in the context of the allocation deci-
sions being modeled here. Although many retail investors have an indirect stake in institutional
portfolios through their pensions, etc., they generally cannot directly access the lower-fee insti-
tutional active management when allocating between active and passive management. Similarly,
institutions making that allocation decision do not face the higher fees of the retail segment. If
the segments are instead pooled, the resulting composite active fee rate actually trends upward,
contrary to the experience of an investor in either segment. The reason for the upward trend is
the relatively higher rate of growth of mutual funds that accompanied the migration from direct
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individual ownership. French (2008) observes that this growth in the retail segment’s share of
the investment management industry is a major factor in keeping society’s overall cost of active
investment relatively constant over the 1980–2006 period, despite reductions in trading costs and
mutual-fund load fees.13
B. Parameter Values
The model parameters are µm, γ, N , σ, c,M , and k. The first four are specified using straight-
forward empirical counterparts. The value of µm = 1.065 is one plus the average return from
1980 through 2012 on the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ portfolio, while the value of
γ = 0.7238 is the variance of that portfolio over the same period (0.1712) divided by the portfolio’s
average return in excess of the one-month Treasury Bill rate (0.0404). The value of N = 6893 is
the average number of stocks on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ over the 1980–2012 period. (The num-
ber of stocks increases and then decreases over that period but does not exhibit a significant trend;
the numbers in 1980 and 2012 are 5006 and 5499 respectively.) The data used to construct all of
the above values are obtained from CRSP. For the value of σ = 0.188, I take the average annual
cross-sectional mean idiosyncratic volatility for all CRSP stocks from 1981 through 2008, using
results reported by Brandt, Brav, Graham, and Kumar (2010).
Specifying values for the remaining parameters c, M , and k is less straightforward. In all
of the model’s equilibrium quantities, as given in Propositions 2 through 5, the parameters c and
M appear only as the ratio c/M . I assume that c/M is constant over time in the calibration
explored here. This is a nontrivial assumption, as opposed to assuming c is constant, since the
number of active managers (M) grew considerably over the 1980–2012 period. To understand the
reasoning, recall from equation (11) that an individual manager’s intermediation cost of taking an
active position of (dollar) amount Di in stock i is c × δi × Di, where δi is the fraction that Di
represents of stock i’s total market capitalization. The relevant question is the extent to which
that intermediation cost depends on how many other active managers wish to take a similar active
position. It seems more likely that growth in the number of managers competing for intermediation
in the same direction increases the cost of taking a position representing any given fraction δi of
the stock, as opposed to leaving that cost unaffected. I assume for tractability that the cost increase
is simply proportionate, so that c/M is constant.
To specify the value for c/M , I rely on the first equality in (28), which implies
c
M
=
σ2f¯
σ2ANy(1− h)
. (44)
17
I then evaluate equation (44) with h, y, f¯ , and σA set to their 1996 (mid-sample) points on the trend
lines in Figure 1 and Panels A through C in Figure 4. This calculation gives c/M = 4.37× 10−4.
One can interpret this value in the context of the implied separate value for c by conditioning
on M in that same mid-sample year. To get a rough estimate of M , I add the number of active
mutual funds in the dataset constructed by Pa´stor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2013) to the number
of institutions other than mutual funds filing Form 13F with the SEC, as provided by Thomson
Reuters. In 1996 this estimate ofM equals 2212, giving an implied value of c = 0.967. In other
words, at this mid-sample value, the proportional cost of taking an active position is approximately
equal to the position’s fraction of the stock’s total market capitalization.
The parameter k determines the distribution of noise-trader weights, as in Figure 3. I specify
k as the value that solves the equilibrium relation for y in equation (25) when h, y, and f¯ again
equal the 1996 points on the trend lines in Figure 1 and in Panels A through C of Figure 4. The
parameter k enters the relation for y via the mispricing measure, ψ, and the value of ψ for a given
k is evaluated numerically using equation (43). The result of this calculation gives k = 0.215,
yielding a distribution for noise-trader weights very close to the case of k = 0.2 plotted in Figure
3. Recall that a distribution with that shape arises from commonality in portfolios across noise
traders, such that low diversification at the individual level survives aggregation to a substantial
degree.
C. Model Trends Versus the Data
I next explore the extent to which the model, calibrated using a single mid-sample year, can
produce the investment trends observed in the years before and after. I first compute the implied
values of the market-adjusted volatility (tracking error) σA conditional on the sample trend values
for h, y, and f¯ . These values for σA do not depend on the value specified for the parameter k. I
then examine the implied values for the active allocation, y, conditional on the trend values for h
and f¯ and all of the parameters.
The model’s implied values for active management’s tracking error computed using equation
(28) are plotted as the dashed line in Figure 5. The implied σA’s exhibit a significant negative trend,
declining from nearly 1.8% in 1980 to 1.2% in 2012. Moreover, the decline is only slightly less
steep than the data-based trend, which declines from nearly 2% in 1980 to 1% in 2012. It appears
that the model as calibrated does indeed produce a declining trend in tracking error that it is fairly
similar to what the mutual-fund data exhibit.
The product yf¯ is determined in equilibrium, but the active allocation, y, and the fee rate, f¯ ,
18
are not determined separately. I therefore condition on the sample trend values for f¯ and then
compute the values for y using equation (25). The model’s implied y values are plotted as the
dashed line in Panel A of Figure 6. The model’s y values exhibit a clear declining trend, so the
model’s implications are in qualitative agreement with the trend in the data. Also apparent in the
plot is that the model as calibrated is in a sense too successful in producing such a trend: the
model’s trend values for y decline from about 120% in 1980 to less than 50% in 2012, whereas
the data trend in y over those same years declines from 92% to 68%. From equation (25), we can
see that for the given decline in h, closer agreement between the model and data trends in y would
require either a steeper decline in the fee rate, f¯ , or a less steep decline in the mispricing measure,
ψ.
The mispricing measure, ψ in equation (43), declines as h declines while k is held constant.
The reason for the decline in ψ in that setting is simply because θ falls as h falls. Recall that θ, given
in equation (34), is the fraction of noise-trader mispricing left uncorrected, and θ is an increasing
function of h. One might ask whether assuming that k remains constant while h declines is the
most reasonable assumption a priori. As h declines and presumably the population of noise traders
shrinks, one might expect that aggregation across noise traders becomes at least somewhat less
successful in washing out the low diversification of individual noise traders. In other words, as h
declines, one might expect the density of v, illustrated previously in Figure 3, to shift mass toward
zero and become more positively skewed. Such a shift corresponds to a decrease in the parameter
k.
I ask how much k must decline over the sample period in order to achieve a close correspon-
dence between the model-implied and data-based trends in y. Recall that k is held constant at
0.215 throughout the sample period in producing the model values of y in Panel A of Figure 6. If
k again equals that value in the mid-sample year 1996 but instead declines linearly with time, from
k = 0.228 in 1980 to k = 0.201 in 2012, then the model’s implied trend in y essentially matches
that of the data, as shown in Panel B of Figure 6. The densities for v corresponding to the 1980
and 2012 values of k are plotted in Figure 7. Viewed from this perspective, the required decline in
k seems rather modest. Moreover, even with this trend in k, the decline in θ due to the decline in
h still produces a substantial overall decline in the mispricing measure ψ, which drops more than
50% between 1980 and 2012, from 0.09 to 0.04.
Active share of the aggregate portfolio is computed AS = (1/2)
∑N
i=1 |φi|, as defined by Cre-
mers and Petajisto (2009). Substituting the second expression for φi in equation (30) gives the
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model’s implied active share,
AS =
1
2
(
σAµm
σψ1/2
)
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣ p¯i − pipm
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
(
σAµm
σψ1/2
)
θ
N∑
i=1
|NφH,i − 1| , (45)
where the second equality applies equation (32) and then (41). Recall that the cross section of
NφH,i − 1 is approximated by the continuous Weibull variable v. The resulting calculation of
active share then becomes
AS =
Nθ
2
(
σAµm
σψ1/2
)
E{|v|}. (46)
The dashed line in Figure 8 plots the model-implied active share in equation (46) for the setting
with k declining as in Panel B of Figure 6. The model AS values exhibit a downward trend with
a slope similar to the data values. The model values are generally about twice as large as the data
values, but the fact that they are even of a similar magnitude seems noteworthy, as there is no use
of active share in calibrating the model. While the model values exceed the sample AS values for
the aggregate active portfolio, they are lower than the values of the average individual fund active
share that Cremers and Petajisto (2009) report in addition to the aggregate values.
D. Negative Alpha
The model implies that αA in equation (27) is positive. This implication for the aggregate
net alpha is at odds with empirical evidence on the performance of active management. Actively
managed equity mutual funds—the segment of active management for which returns data are most
available—have historically provided investors with net average returns below those on passive
benchmarks. For example, the value-weighted portfolio of the actively managed mutual funds in
the dataset constructed by Pa´stor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2013) has an annualized estimated net
alpha equal to -0.31% (t-statistic: -1.06) for the 1980–2011 period.14
A positive net alpha occurs in equilibrium if investors have rational expectations and allocate
the correct amount to active management. As discussed earlier, if investors allocate too much, the
resulting alpha is lower. Consider, for example, the first year of the sample period, 1980. Under the
above calibration of the model (including the modest decline in k), the value of αA in equation (27)
is equal to 0.039% per annum. In other words, under rational expectations, the net alpha is slightly
positive, just large enough (recalling equation 23) to induce an allocation (y) of 91% to active
management when that portfolio’s volatility (σA) is 1.75% and the index fund has γ = 0.7238.
(The values for σA and y correspond to the model’s 1980 implied values in Figure 5 and Panel B
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of Figure 6; recall that γ is the market’s variance divided by its expected excess return.) Suppose
that an allocation of 91% is higher than it should be given the true degree of mispricing, and that
the correct value of y is instead 70%, so that λ in Proposition 5 equals 1.3 (= 91/70). Applying
equation (37) then gives a resulting net alpha ofα∗A = −0.31%, equal to the sample estimate for the
post-1980 period. As discussed earlier, α∗A is decreasing in λ, so active managers face decreasing
returns to scale with respect to the size of their industry.
While it is appealing to assume that investors have rational expectations and allocate correctly,
Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2012) show that the presence of industry-level decreasing returns to scale
presents investors with an inference problem that can involve slow learning about the degree of
decreasing returns and thus slow convergence to the correct allocation. Pa´stor and Stambaugh
analyze this learning problem with a constant true underlying relation between the size of the
active management industry and active management’s alpha. In the current setting, that relation
changes over time as the noise trader fraction h changes. Incorporating learning is beyond this
study’s scope, but one might suspect that moving from a stable returns-to-scale relation to one that
shifts through time can only make investors’ inference problem more difficult. It seems reasonable
to entertain over-allocation to active management as the source of the negative estimated historical
alpha. One might further entertain the retail segment of investors as being a potential source of
over-allocation, at least compared to the institutional segment, given that the retail segment has
allocated a greater fraction to active management despite being subject to higher fee rates.
It is important to note that in general the rational reaction by investors in aggregate to nega-
tive realized alpha is not to abandon active management entirely. Allocating too little to active
management leaves investors with a lower Sharpe ratio than they could otherwise obtain, since the
equilibrium alpha on active management is then too high. Of course, from a societal perspective,
allocating too little to active management also creates a negative externality, in that equilibrium
prices have larger errors and thus the allocation of society’s resources across firms can be less
efficient.
E. Fees, Noise Traders, and Future Trends
As discussed previously (Proposition 2), the model uniquely determines the product of the fee
rate, f , and the active allocation, y, but does not determine those quantities individually. The prod-
uct fy is the fraction of investors’ stock market wealth that active managers receive as fee revenue,
while the product (1 − h)fy is the fraction of total stock market value received as fee revenue.
The noise-trader fraction, h, enters the right-hand side of equation (25) at several places, including
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ψ, and the latter quantity is computed using numerical integration to evaluate the expectation in
equation (43). As a result, the dependence of fee revenue on h is not straightforward to charac-
terize analytically, but the function is easily plotted. Figure 9 plots both fy and (1 − h)fy as a
function of h, with the model parameters equal to those calibrated earlier at the mid-sample values.
Fee revenue as a fraction of investors’ stock market wealth, fy, is increasing in the noise trader
fraction, h, and fee revenue goes to zero as h does. Fee revenue as a fraction of total stock market
value, (1 − h)fy, is increasing in h at lower h values but decreasing at higher values. In other
words, as investors own a progressively smaller fraction of the stock market, the fee revenue they
pay eventually falls even though it represents an ever higher fraction of their stock market wealth.
As a final perspective on trends, I explore what the model implies if previous trends continue
into the future. The basic theme of this study is that a decline over time in the presence of noise
traders, proxied here by the fraction of equity owned directly by individuals, brings with it changes
in the characteristics of professional active management. If the noise trader fraction, h, continues
to decline, how might the investment landscape continue to change? To investigate this question, I
simply extrapolate the linear trend in h into the future. That declining trend hits h = 0 in about 28
years, around the year 2042. Because y and f are not separately determined, as before I condition
on one quantity and then examine the other. For this exercise, I condition on y and imagine that
active management’s share, relative to indexing, continues its decline, following the same linear
trend fit through 2012. By 2042, active management’s share of professional management then
declines to about 45%. These trends in h and y are displayed in Panel A of Figure 10.
Given the hypothetical trends in h and y, I compute the model’s implied future values for the
average fee, f¯ , and the active tracking error, σA. These values are plotted in Panel B of Figure 10.
Observe that both f¯ and σA approach zero as h approaches zero. In other words, in order to manage
a non-trivial share of investors’ stock market wealth, active managers must behave increasingly like
index funds (assumed to have zero fees in the model).
IV. Conclusions
In the equilibrium model developed and calibrated here, active management corrects most of
the noise-trader induced mispricing that would otherwise exist. A fraction of the mispricing re-
mains uncorrected, because active managers are impeded by both risk and trading costs. The
remaining mispricing allows investors who allocate a portion of their wealth to active management
to profit (earn alpha) at the expense of noise traders. The fraction of mispricing that remains uncor-
rected by active management shrinks as the fraction of the equity market owned by noise traders
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declines. The decline in noise trading thus dictates a smaller footprint for active management. That
smaller footprint can involve lower fees and lower tracking error, or a lower allocation by investors
to active management, or a combination of those effects. For individual active managers as well as
their overall industry, the fee revenue collected is invariant to the fee rate; a higher fee rate simply
means that investors allocate correspondingly less money to be managed. Both the alpha and the
market-adjusted volatility of the aggregate active portfolio are proportional to the fee rate, which
therefore drops out of that portfolio’s information ratio.
Active management in recent decades experienced downward trends in (i) market share, (ii) fee
rates, (iii) tracking error, and (iv) deviations from benchmark stock weightings (active share). The
model contains two unknown parameters in addition to those that have straightforward empirical
counterparts. The first parameter governs trading costs while the second parameter characterizes
the extent to which the low diversification typical of individual investors survives aggregation.
These two parameters are calibrated using mid-sample (1996) levels for the fraction of individual
equity ownership, the market share of active management, the active fee rate, and tracking error.
Implied values for the other years in the 1980–2012 sample period reveal that the downward trends
in active management are mutually consistent with a decline in the fraction of the market owned by
individual investors, viewed here as noise traders. If individual ownership and thus noise trading
continue to decline, the model implies that both fee revenue and tracking error must decline as
well, just to keep active management’s market share from declining more rapidly in the future than
it did during the 1980–2012 period.
It is well known that active management in aggregate has historically under-performed passive
benchmarks. If investors unwittingly allocate more to active management than is justified by the
current fee rate and degree of noise-trader mispricing, then the resulting alpha on active manage-
ment can become negative. In other words, the active management industry in the model exhibits
decreasing returns to scale. If investors must arrive at the appropriate investment level by infer-
ring empirically the effect of scale on performance, adjustment to the correct level of investment
can be slow, as shown by Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2012). A prescription that all investors react
to the historical under-performance by simply reallocating everything to passive investing would
be ill-advised, however, at least in the context of the model. Unless there is zero noise trading,
the result would leave an unexploited positive alpha for potential active investing as well as fully
uncorrected noise-trader induced mispricing. The latter would presumably impose a significant
negative externality arising from allocational inefficiency.
The simple model presented here abstracts from potentially important considerations in addi-
tion to the retail-versus-institutional segmentation discussed earlier. Incorporating heterogeneity
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in skill and information across investment managers is likely a potentially important extension.
Also, the current model takes the information possessed by active managers as exogenous. An-
other worthwhile extension would be to make information acquisition endogenous, possibly an
increasing function of fee revenue. These and other issues leave much for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: First note that before fees and costs, the manager’s market-adjusted
rate of return is
∑N
i=1 φ
(j)
A,iRi =
∑N
i=1 φ
(j)
i Ri, since
∑N
i=1 φm,iRi = 0. The fee reduces this rate of re-
turn by f (j). The manager’s trading cost for asset i isC
(j)
i = cδ
(j)
i |φ(j)i |W (j) = c
(
|φ(j)i |W (j)/pi
)
|φ(j)i |W (j),
and thus trading costs reduce themanager’s rate of return by
(∑N
i=1C
(j)
i
)
/W (j) = cW (j)
∑N
i=1(φ
(j)
i )
2/pi.
The manager’s net market-adjusted return is therefore
R
(j)
A =
N∑
i=1
φ
(j)
i Ri − f (j) − cW (j)
N∑
i=1
(φ
(j)
i )
2/pi, (A1)
so
α
(j)
A =
N∑
i=1
φ
(j)
i αi − f (j) − cW (j)
N∑
i=1
(φ
(j)
i )
2/pi (A2)
and
σ
(j)
A =
[
N∑
i=1
(
φ
(j)
i
)2 (pm
pi
)
σ2
]1/2
, (A3)
where the last equality uses equation (9) and the property that the Ri’s are mutually uncorrelated.
To streamline notation, hereafter suppress the superscript (j) and define the N-element vectors
α and φ, whose i-th elements equal αi and φ
(j)
i respectively. Also define the N × N matrix P
with i-th diagonal element equal to pi and all non-diagonal elements equal to zero. The portfolio
parameters in equations (A2) and (A3) can then be rewritten as
αA = φ
′α − f − cWφ′P−1φ (A4)
and
σA = p
1/2
m σ
(
φ′P−1φ
)1/2
. (A5)
The manager chooses the vector of active weights φ to maximize IA = αA/σA subject to ι
′φ = 0,
where ι′ = (1 1 · · · 1). (Recall that the manager takes α, P , andW as given.) The corresponding
Lagrangian is
L = φ
′α− f − cWφ′P−1φ
p
1/2
m σ (φ′P−1φ)
1/2
− ξ˜(ι′φ), (A6)
Differentiating with respect to φ and multiplying through by p1/2m σ (φ
′P−1φ)
1/2
gives
α− 2cWP−1φ− φ
′α− f − cWφ′P−1φ
φ′P−1φ
P−1φ− ξι = 0, (A7)
where ξ is the rescaled Lagrange multiplier. Multiplying through by P and rearranging gives
φ =
(
cW +
φ′α − f
φ′P−1φ
)
−1
P (α − ξι). (A8)
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Note that since the market-weighted combination of the αi’s is zero, ι
′Pα = 0. Therefore, since
ι′φ = 0, multiplying both sides of equation (A8) by ι′ implies ξ = 0, and thus
φ =
(
cW +
φ′α − f
φ′P−1φ
)
−1
Pα. (A9)
Multiplying both sides of equation (A9) by φ′P−1 and rearranging gives
φ′P−1φ =
f
cW
, (A10)
which implies equation (15), since total costs equal cW 2φ′P−1φ. Substituting equation (A10) into
equation (A9) gives
φ =
f
cWφ′α
Pα. (A11)
Multiplying both sides of equation (A11) by α′ and then solving for φ′α gives
φ′α =
(
f
cW
)1/2
(α′Pα)
1/2
=
(
fpm
cW
)1/2
ψ1/2, (A12)
which when substituted into equation (A11) gives
φ =
(
fpm
cW
)1/2
ψ−1/2
1
pm
Pα. (A13)
Equation (A13) gives equations (12) and (13), noting from equation (7) that (pi/pm)αi = µm(p¯i−
pi)/pm. Substituting from equations (A10) and (A12) into equation (A4) gives
αA =
(
fpm
cW
)1/2
ψ1/2 − f − cW f
cW
, (A14)
which is equivalent to equation (16). Substituting from equation (A10) into equation (A5) gives
equation (17). Equation (18) follows directly when dividing equation (16) by equation (17).
Proof of Proposition 2: Applying equation (21) to equation (16), using the fund weight ω(j) in
equation (19), gives
αA =
M∑
j=1
f¯
Mf (j)

(f (j)pmψ
cW (j)
)1/2
− 2f (j)

 = M∑
j=1
f¯
Mf (j)

(f (j)pmψ
cg/f (j)
)1/2
− 2f (j)


= f¯


(
ψ
cg/pm
)1/2
− 2

 = f¯


(
ψ
cf¯y(1− h)N/M
)1/2
− 2

 , (A15)
where the last equality uses the relation for g as defined earlier and used in equation (19),
g = f¯y(1− h)pmN/M, (A16)
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which follows from the fact that since the aggregate value of the stock market isNpm, the aggregate
value of the amount invested in active management is equal to y(1 − h)(Npm) = ∑Mj=1W (j) =∑M
j=1 g/f
(j) = Mg/f¯ , using equation (20). Similarly, applying equation (22) to equation (17)
gives
σ2A =

 M∑
j=1
f¯
Mf (j)
(
σ2f (j)pm
cW (j)
)1/2
2
=

 M∑
j=1
f¯
Mf (j)
(
σ2f (j)pm
cg/f (j)
)1/2
2
=
[
σf¯
cg/pm
]2
=
σ2f¯2
f¯y(1− h)N(c/M) =
σ2f¯
y(1− h)N(c/M) . (A17)
Applying the equilibrium condition y = γ(αA/σ
2
A) in equation (23) then requires that y solves
y = γ
f¯
[(
ψ
cf¯y(1−h)N/M
)1/2 − 2]
f¯σ2
cy(1−h)N/M
=
γ
σ2

y1/2
(
c(1− h)N/M
f¯
)1/2
ψ1/2 − 2cy(1− h)N/M

 , (A18)
which is readily verified to have the solution in equation (25).
Proof of Proposition 3: Substituting f¯ y from equation (25) into the last expression in equation
(A15) gives
αA = f¯

ψ1/2

cψN(1− h)(c/M)
(
γ
σ2 + 2γN(1− h)(c/M)
)2
(1− h)N/M


−1/2
− 2

 ,
and simplifying gives equation (27). The first equality in equation (28) is given by the last expres-
sion in equation (A17). Substituting y from equation (25) into that expression gives
σA = σf¯

ψN(1− h)(c/M)
(
γ
σ2 + 2γN(1 − h)(c/M)
)2
(1− h)N(c/M)


−1/2
,
and simplifying gives the second equality in (28). It is straightforward to verify that dividing
the right-hand side of equation (27) by the rightmost expression equation (28) gives the second
equality in (29). From equations (12), (13), and (19), the aggregate active weight in stock i,
φi =
∑M
j=1 ω
(j)φ
(j)
i , is given by
φi =
M∑
j=1
f¯
Mf (j)
µm
(
f (j)pm
cW (j)ψ
)1/2(
p¯i − pi
pm
)
= f¯µm
(
1
(c/M)f¯ y(1− h)Nψ
)1/2(
p¯i − pi
pm
)
, (A19)
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where the second equality substitutesW (j) = g/f (j) and then applies equation (A16). This is the
first equality given in (30). To obtain the second equality, substitute for f¯ y from equation (25),
which gives
φi = f¯µm

(c/M)ψN(1− h)(c/M)
(
γ
σ2 + 2γN(1− h)(c/M)
)2
(1− h)Nψ


−1/2 (
p¯i − pi
pm
)
= f¯µmψ
−1
(
2 +
σ2
γN(1− h)(c/M)
)(
p¯i − pi
pm
)
=
µm
σψ1/2
[
f¯ σ
ψ1/2
(
2 +
σ2
γN(1− h)(c/M)
)](
p¯i − pi
pm
)
,
which gives the second equality in (30), using equation (28).
Proof of Proposition 4: The investors’ aggregate weight in stock i is
φS,i = (1− y)φm,i + yφA,i = (1− y)φm,i + y(φm,i + φi) = φm,i + yφi. (A20)
Substituting the last expression for φS,i into the market-clearing condition in equation (31) gives
hφH,i + (1− h)(φm,i + yφi) = φm,i, (A21)
or
h(φH,i − φm,i) = y(1− h)φi. (A22)
Then substituting the identities φH,i = pˆi/(Npm) and φm,i = pi/(Npm) as well as the expression
for φi in equation (30) gives
h
(
pˆi
Npm
− pi
Npm
)
= y(1− h)f¯µm
(
1
(c/M)f¯ y(1− h)Nψ
)1/2 (
p¯i − pi
pm
)
= (1− h)µm
(
f¯y
(c/M)(1 − h)Nψ
)1/2 (
p¯i − pi
pm
)
. (A23)
Substituting for f¯y from equation (25) and simplifying gives
pˆi − pi = 1− h
h
(
γµm
σ2/N + 2γ(1− h)(c/M)
)
(p¯i − pi) , (A24)
which directly yields equation (32) for θ as defined in equation (34).
Proof of Proposition 5: Let ψ∗ denote the mispricing measure defined in equation (14) that
reflects the equililbrium prices that result when investors allocate y∗ to the optimal active portfolio.
Observe that, since managers condition on prices, the relations in Proposition 1 hold with ψ equal
to ψ∗, and thus the optimal portfolio of active managers continues to be that with fund weights
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given by ω(j) in equation (19), such that fee revenue is equal across managers. The aggregate
active weight in stock i in that portfolio is therefore given by equation (30) with ψ equal to ψ∗ and
y equal to y∗:
φ∗i = f¯µm
(
1
(c/M)f¯ y∗(1− h)Nψ∗
)1/2(
p¯i − pi
pm
)
. (A25)
The optimal allocation to the above aggregate active portfolio is given by equation (25) with ψ set
to ψ∗, but instead the allocation y∗ is λ times that optimal amount, resulting in
f¯y∗ = λψ∗N(1− h)(c/M)
(
γ
σ2 + 2γN(1− h)(c/M)
)2
. (A26)
The market-clearing condition as stated in equation (A22) becomes
h(φH,i − φm,i) = y∗(1− h)φ∗i . (A27)
As before when proceeding from equation (A22) to (A23), substituting into equation (A27) the
identities for φH,i and φm,i as well as φ
∗
i in equation (A25) gives
h
(
pˆi
Npm
− pi
Npm
)
= (1− h)µm
(
f¯y∗
(c/M)(1 − h)Nψ∗
)1/2(
p¯i − pi
pm
)
. (A28)
Substituting for f¯y∗ from equation (A26) and simplifying then gives
pˆi − pi = λ1/2 1− h
h
(
γµm
σ2/N + 2γ(1− h)(c/M)
)
(p¯i − pi) , (A29)
which directly yields equation (32) with θ replaced by θ∗ as defined in equation (36). The net alpha
on the aggregate active portfolio is given by equation (A15) with y and ψ set to y∗ and ψ∗:
α∗A = f¯

( ψ∗
cf¯y∗(1− h)N/M
)1/2
− 2

 . (A30)
Substituting for f¯y∗ from equation (A26) and simplifying gives
α∗A = f¯
[
λ−1/2
(
σ2 + 2γN(1− h)(c/M)
γN(1− h)(c/M)
)
− 2
]
= λ−1/2
(
f¯σ2
γN(1− h)(c/M) − 2f¯ (λ
1/2 − 1)
)
, (A31)
which is equivalent to equation (37), using equation (27). The market-adjusted variance of the
aggregate active portfolio is given by equation (A17) with y set to y∗:
σ∗2A =
σ2f¯
y∗(1− h)N(c/M) . (A32)
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Substituting for y∗ from equation (A26) and simplifying gives
σ∗2A =
f¯2σ2
λψ∗
(
σ2 + 2γN(1− h)(c/M)
γN(1− h)(c/M)
)2
=
ψ
λψ∗

 f¯2σ2
ψ
(
2 +
σ2
γN(1− h)(c/M)
)2 ,
and taking square roots gives equation (38), using equation (28). The result for I∗A in equation (39)
then follows directly from division of α∗A by σ
∗
A.
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Figure 1. Individual Equity Ownership. The solid line plots annual values for the fraction of
the US equity market that is owned directly by individuals. The dotted line plots a linear trend fit
through the data points.
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Figure 2. Trends in ActiveManagement. Panel A plots the fraction of equity mutual fund assets that are
actively managed (thicker line) and the fraction of institutionally owned equity that is actively managed
(thinner line). Panel B plots the aggregate cost to investors of owning active equity mutual funds (thicker
line) and the aggregate fee paid by institutional investors for active equity management. Panel C plots
the estimated tracking error of the aggregate portfolio of active equity mutual funds. Panel D plots the
estimated active share of that portfolio.
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Figure 3. Noise Trading Densities. The figure plots alternative specifications of a Weibull density
for approximating the cross-sectional distribution of NφH,i, where N is the number of stocks in
the market and φH,i is the aggregate weight that noise traders place in stock i. All densities have
1.0 as the mean and differ with respect to the shape parameter k.
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Figure 4. Fitted Investment Trends. Panels A through D display the data series plotted in Figure 2 (solid
lines) as well as the fitted linear trends (dotted lines) used in the model calibration. In Panels A and B, the
trend is constructed as the average of the linear trends fitted through the mutual-fund series (thicker lines)
and the institutional series (thinner lines).
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Figure 5. Active Management Tracking Error. The figure plots the estimated year-by-year
tracking error for equity mutual funds (solid line), the linear trend fitted through those values
(dotted line), and the implied model values for aggregate tracking error (dashed line). The model
parameter governing trading costs is calibrated to the mid-sample 1996 trend level of tracking
error.
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Figure 6. Allocation to ActiveManagement. The figure plots the year-by-year fractions of equity
under active management (solid lines), the trends based on that data (dotted lines), and the model
implied values (dashed lines). In Panel A, the parameter k, which characterizes the distribution of
noise-trader weights, is held constant at 0.215, the value calibrated to the mid-sample 1996 level
of the data trend. In panel B, the value of k declines linearly from 0.228 in 1980 to 0.201 in 2012.
36
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
N × Noise−Trader Weight
De
ns
ity
 V
al
ue
 
 
k = 0.228 (1980)
k = 0.201 (2012)
Figure 7. Shift in Noise Trading Densities. The figure plots the Weibull densities for NφH,i
that correspond to the 1980 and 2012 values of the shape parameter k that declines linearly when
constructing Panel B of Figure 6. N is the number of stocks in the market and φH,i is the aggregate
weight that noise traders place in stock i. Both densities have 1.0 as the mean.
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Figure 8. Active Share. The figure plots the year-by-year estimates of active share (solid line),
the trend based on that data (dotted line), and the model implied values (dashed line).
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Figure 9. Noise Trading and Fee Revenue. The figure plots the model’s implied relation between
fee revenue and the fraction of the equity market owned by noise traders (h). The solid line plots
f¯y, where f¯ is the average fee rate and y is the fraction of investors’ stock-market wealth allocated
to active management. The dashed line plots (1 − h)f¯y, which is fee revenue as a fraction of the
total value of the stock market.
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Figure 10. Future Investment Trends. The plots in Panel A extrapolate into future years the
linear trends in Figures 1 and 4 in the fraction (h) of the equity market owned by noise traders
(dotted line) and the fraction (y) investors allocate to active management (dash-dot line). Given
those trends, Figure B plots the model’s implied values for active management’s fee rate (dashed
line) and tracking error (dash-dot line).
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Footnotes
1See Black (1986, p. 531). Kyle (1985) also advances the concept of noise traders, whom Kyle
models as random in their trading.
2French reports estimates through 2007. I extend his series through 2012 by taking b times
the fraction of equity held by households (including nonprofits) reported by the Federal Reserve,
where b is the ratio of French’s 2007 value to the Fed’s 2007 value.
3The mutual fund series in Panels A and B are supplied by the Investment Company Institute.
Both institutional series are constructed with estimates reported by French (2008), who uses data
from Greenwich Associates. That firm informs me that they recently adopted the policy that their
data not be made available (by them or their clients) for academic research.
4I am grateful to Martijn Cremers for supplying this active share series, computed with respect
to the Russell 1000 market benchmark. The plot displays within-year averages of quarterly values.
5In this interpretation, the trading cost is not viewed as a manager-specific price impact, such
that if many other managers independently produce similar price impacts, the sum of such impacts
aggregates to an implausibly large total price effect. Instead, one might imagine many intermedi-
aries accessing different sources of liquidity or acting at slightly different times.
6Additional empirical studies include Chen et al. (2004), Pollet andWilson (2008), Yan (2008),
Ferreira et al. (2013a,b), and Reuter and Zitzewitz (2013).
7Hugonnier and Kaniel (2010) obtain a similar result for an active manager who dynamically
allocates to equities and a riskless asset, although when the manager invests only in equities (as
here), the fee irrelevance no longer obtains. Berk and Green (2004) also present a setting in which
the manager’s fee revenue is invariant to the fee rate.
8It is straightforward to verify that right-hand side of equation (34) has a positive derivative
with respect to h.
9Other studies reporting evidence of the poor diversification of individual portfolios include
Kelly (1995) and Goetzmann and Kumar (2008).
10As Merton (1987) discusses, such constraints need not reflect behavioral bias and can be
modeled in a rational setting.
11For a discussion of the Weibull distribution, see for example Johnson and Kotz (1970, chapter
20).
12A complimentary literature analyzes how cyclical fluctuations bear on active management.
See, for example, Glode (2011), Kosowski (2011), and Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veld-
kamp (2013a, 2013b).
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13Also playing a role in maintaining the overall cost were the relatively high fees of hedge funds,
whose share of the equity market grew to about 2.2% by 2007, according to French’s estimates.
Hedge funds represent an additional segment of equity ownership, in addition to mutual funds and
institutional portfolios, that I do not include here.
14Studies reporting negative average fund alphas include Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995), Gruber
(1996), Wermers (2000), Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2002), Fama and French (2010), and Del Guercio
and Reuter (2013).
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